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Strategic alliances are common to any industry. Their presence is felt quite significantly in the
airline industry. Starting in the US in 1978 deregulation of airline industry has since brought
about sea changes in functioning of the industry. This paper attempts to understand the
developments and strategic alliances that have occurred in the airline industry since
deregulation. These strategic alliances exist in various forms and differ widely in scope and
no consensus on classification was found. The advantages and disadvantages of strategic
alliances with respect to the airline industry have been discussed. It is felt that the industry is
getting increasingly concentrated. However, no conclusive remarks can be made about
consumer welfare.
 “Airline Business Alliance Survey of 2000 reports that there are 579 alliance
agreements in place, up from 280 agreements (more than double) in 1994 when the
survey was first conducted. Five major alliances (Star, Oneworld, Qualiflyer, Sky
Team, and Wings) account for some 60 percent of all air travel.” (Mason, 2002)
The lines above make the issue important enough to understand the phenomenon that
is guiding the industry. Almost a decade back Oum, Taylor and Zhang (1993) argued
that the airline industry will be marked by strategic alliances and these alliances will
be global in nature. The guiding factors will be several that include formation of
blocs, resource scarcity, limits on foreign ownership and limitations imposed by
bilateral agreements. They further forwarded the argument that to be a part of an
alliance will become a necessity for an airline to survive in the future.
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As we look today around us, there are alliances of various types all over. An effort is
being is made to understand the literature on alliances in the global air transport
industry.
The air passenger transport industry has been one of the major drivers behind rapid
globalization of the world businesses and the consequent shortening of the distances
on the planet. The face of the industry as we see today has a history of its own.
Starting in 1909 on a relatively insignificant note with the invention of an airplane, it
has come a long way in less than 100 years. The technological developments made till
the end of the Second World War made it possible for airplanes to become capable of
flying passengers and goods across continents in a short span of time. However, the
most noted use(s) of the aircraft may best be termed undesirable and unfortunate, still
there is no doubt that the airplanes took the world by storm since Second World War.
With the Chicago convention of 1944, a structure to govern international air travel
started taking place. Today 1.83 billion passengers fly nearly 3.3 trillion RPKs. The
aviation industry employs 1.77 million people directly and 17,650 aircraft (including
freighters; Airbus puts the passenger plane number at 10,349 at the end of the year
1999) are in service (data as of 2001).
DEREGULATION: THE FREEDOM TO THE INDUSTRY
Starting off in the US in 1978, the deregulation of the air passenger transport industry
brought sea changes in the industry. European countries emulated the steps within
next 10 years. With deregulation setting in, there was freedom to choose routes to
operate on, set the prices as demanded/ told by the market with no government
intervention on the prices. In other words, deregulation was aimed at bringing in total
welfare of the consumers using air-transport. Initially, the freedom led to increased
competition in the market place following new entry in the business leading to
lowering of prices in the markets that put further pressures on the bottom lines of the3
airlines companies' balance sheets. Subsequently, the focus shifted on economising
the operations so as to reduce the costs and arrest the price increases so as to boost the
margins and keep the airlines in business. Still some majors (like Pan Am in the US)
of the pre-deregulation era found it difficult to survive and went out of business
selling off their rights for domestic and international routes to different buyers.
The cost cutting efforts led to rationalization of route structures. The efforts to gain
efficiency led to formation of hub and spoke networks wherein the "traffic feed" was
brought in to a central place (the hub) from other areas in the vicinity of the hub (the
spokes). The flights from the hub took off for their destinations with the passengers
sorted and boarded on a flight leaving for their destination. This did result in some
discomfort to some passengers as they might have to change the aircraft at the hub,
still there were benefits like that of single ticketing and lower fares to most of the
passengers. This tilted the balance in favour of hub-and-spokes networks’ approval by
public at large.  This hub and spoke network led to maximum utilization of the
resources and elimination of duplication of efforts was greatly saved that resulted in
substantial savings to the incumbent airlines. This hub and spoke network is prevalent
today all over the world. Globally, New York, London, Amsterdam, Dubai, Singapore
and Tokyo are the best examples of the hub wherein passengers flow in from all
corners of the region and again take off for their respective destinations. Over period
of time these hubs have developed into fortress hubs i.e., a particular carrier or family
of carriers dominates the hubs. For example, airports at Charlotte, Denver and
Washington Dulles are dominated by US Airways/ United Airlines to the monopoly
levels (above 70 percent as per US standards) (Cooper, 2001).
Owing to the continuous drive towards achieving better margins through cost cutting
there has been a gradual and steady decline in the real value of airline yields all over
US and the Europe (Doganis, 2001, p.9); i.e. the average revenue per passenger-km
(RPK) has declined. In a study on the after effects of deregulation in the US, Thirer
(1998) noted that air travel has increased steadily since deregulation and the fares in4
1997 were 40% lower than the 1978 levels (1982 constant dollar yield). The
consumer benefits at the 1993-dollar prices were estimated to be $19.4 billion
(Crandall and Ellig (1997) as quoted in Thirer (1998)). Also the number of passengers
flying has increased by almost 140% from approximately 250 million in 1978 to
nearly 600 million in 1997.
Also the creation of fortress hubs that integrated domestic and international routes
resulted in enhanced international competitiveness of the US carriers, as they were
now able to leverage huge feeds available for their international operations. This
achievement of critical mass by the US airlines in their domestic market forced them
to look for opportunities outside the US market. The need to find foothold in other
markets in the regime of (mostly) restrictive bilateral agreements gave rise to another
thoughtful idea of “Open Markets” policy by the US in 1978. Pustay (1992) has also
noted that the move towards “Open Markets” initiated by the US was also responsible
for changing the structure of the international air travel industry. The open market
policy was aimed at providing maximum consumer benefits of competition in the
market place. Not only there was freer market access for both foreign and US carriers,
but multiple designations of airlines from both sides were also made available. Still,
there were some nationality requirements of the ownership of the designated airlines.
The capacities were set to ‘unlimited’, and double disapproval of tariffs (i.e. filed
tariffs chargeable unless both governments disapprove) was enforced. In 1978, US
efforts towards “open market” were initially seconded by the Netherlands. Then due
to market dynamics, Germany and Belgium also signed “open market” agreements
with the US (Doganis, 2001, p. 23-25). Europe also gradually moved away from
traditional bilateral air service agreements (ASAs) that were restrictive in nature as
they allowed limited number of routes to be operated on with very few fifth freedom
rights. Single designation and capacities were also agreed upon in advance and double
approval for tariffs was required. (Though some of these features were revised in the
Bermuda agreement, still there were large restrictions on the operating airlines.
Notably, most of the world’s ASAs are still of traditional types as noted by Doganis,5
2001, p.21). In 1984, UK and Netherlands signed an “open market” agreement that
resulted in effective deregulation of air services between the two countries. Later
somewhat similar agreements that ensured freedom of air services were signed with
Germany, Luxembourg, France, Belgium, Switzerland and Ireland. Some important
restrictions placed were of nationality of the airline ownership and limitation of the
fifth freedom rights that, however, were less restricting on the US airlines. Also,
while there were limitations on the number of gateways available to the foreign
airlines in the US, the US airlines had the freedom to fly from any point in the US to
the foreign country.
Similar moves towards deregulation of air services took place in other parts as well.
Japan Airlines’ virtual monopoly on international routes was broken with the
international operations allowance to All Nippon Airways in 1986. Similarly, new
airlines like EVA Air in Taiwan, Asiana in Korea, Ryanair in Ireland and Lauda Air
in Austria were allowed to operate international flights.
In some cases these “Open Market” agreements were renegotiated to “Open Skies”
agreement. These new agreements inaugurated the first phase of international
deregulation. US-Netherlands was the first pair of countries to sign the Open Skies
agreement. Later Germany, Belgium, Switzerland, Singapore, Korea and Japan joined
the league. It is important to note that these agreements had some variations as per
demands of the negotiating countries. The “Open Skies” agreement marked an end to
the disparities that existed in the earlier Open Market agreements. Now the airlines
from both the signatory countries had the freedom to fly to any desired point in the
other country. Also granted were unlimited fifth freedom rights and multiple
designations of airlines with no restrictions on frequency or capacity. The fares were
to be in line with the market conditions and there was full freedom for making
commercial agreements. (Doganis, 2001, pp.: 30-32).
These activities were not limited to US alone. Other countries like New Zealand were
quite active in entering into similar agreements with other countries. It signed Open6
Skies pact with the US, Singapore, Brunei, Malaysia, the UAE and Chile. It also
signed for a single aviation pact with Australia, which in turn signed its first Open
Skies agreement with the UAE. The notable feature of the pact was that Australia was
willing to give Seventh Freedom Rights for a stand-alone air services between the
bilateral partner and a third country on a case-by-case basis. However, domestic
cabotage was not possible.
With changes in the US and the formation of single European aviation market since
1993, there is a shift in favour of market-based approaches in the air travel industry
(Brueckner and Whalen, 1998; Yergin, Vietor and Evans, 2000). Pustay (1992) also
puts forth the conclusion that these efforts made other countries emulate the US
policies as these measures resulted in tightening of control of the US airlines on their
domestic feed to the international flights. This undoubtedly increased the international
competitiveness of the US airlines.
ALLIANCES: HOW, WHEN AND WHAT
It has been pointed out earlier that US airlines found the US market place too
crowded to fight the competition. Doganis (1994) observed that in 1989 the six largest
US carriers generated 84% of US domestic passenger kilometres, as per year 2000
data, the top 6 airlines in US in terms of RPKs, have a share of over 72% of the total
US RPKs. Europeans took a cue from the US experience and found that the size was
necessary not to get the economies of scale, but to attain economies of scope with
deeper and wider reach in the market. To achieve the desired economies of scope,
alliances were a handy solution as the cross-border alliances or mergers had the
potential for generating traffic feed between an airline and its partner.7
European airlines threatened by the US moves to garner large shares of the
transatlantic air passenger market decided to enter into marketing alliances. However,
these marriages of convenience proved to be short-lived and less beneficial to the
partners. The alliances between United Airlines and British Airways and that between
Air France and Lufthansa were such examples (Doganis, 1994).
In order to achieve desired economies of scale, European carriers came up with a
three-pronged approach (Doganis, 1994 and 2001). The first step of this approach was
to make sure that the airlines had a dominant position in its home market. This was
done through purchasing the smaller airlines in the market (e.g., KLM buying into
shares of Netherlines and a charter carrier, Transavia) or by increasing the shares
through launch of new airlines that cater to a different market segment. As in the case
of British Airways which merged its wholly owned subsidiaries, British Regional
Airlines and Brymon Airways in March 2002 to British Airways Citi Express. Its
2001 acquisition of British Regional airlines group further strengthened its position in
the UK domestic market.
The second step was to gain foothold in other major European markets. The major
constituents of the European market are the UK, Germany and France. SAS did this
by purchasing shares of British Midland’s parent company in 1988. British Airways
acquired majority stakes in Deutsche BA in Germany. It also bought equity in Air
Russia. As discussed above, recently the launch of British Airways Citi Express also
made it garner a larger share in the European pie. It has now increased its share in the
European air passenger market.
The  third strategic option was to establish a global presence through marketing
alliances with other non-European airlines or making share purchases in them. The
point was to enter the markets that were under-represented by the incumbent airline.
Obviously, the market choice for the European carriers was the American market and
the Asia-Pacific market as they are the largest markets outside the European Common
market for air passenger traffic. With this aim British Airways purchased stakes8
within 2 months in Qantas in 1992 and in US Air in 1993. These purchases made
some room for British Airways in the Pacific and the US market.
de Wit (1996) makes similar observation when he identifies that European airlines are
restructuring their networks to increase their competitiveness. The airlines in Europe
are entering into alliances of all sorts by way of equity purchase, code share
agreements, block-space arrangements, wet leases, franchising agreements and joint
ventures. Transnational alliances as in case of SAS and Swissair, BA-Deutsche BA,
TAT and Maersk Air, KLM and Air UK were also observed. These alliances were
expected to lead to network economies and the reinforcement of home base, thereby
ensuring increased feed and formation of fortress ‘Euro’ hubs, similar to those in US.
Sabena, SAS, KLM and Lufthansa have reportedly developed such hubs at their
respective home bases.
KLM, Lufthansa, Swissair (now Swiss) and SAS, all followed similar three pronged
strategies during late 1980s and the 1990s. BA, however, was the first to develop a
clear plan of taking 3 steps to gain the market. It continuously increased its stake in
various airlines. BA bought 40% share in Brymon Airways in 1987 and subsequently
purchased it outright in 1993. Its moves of taking over of British Celadonian in late
1987; 1992 acquisition of principal European and domestic scheduled routes of Dan-
Air which eventually helped it to strengthen its hold on Gatwick Airport; 1993
franchisee arrangements with Maersk Air and City Flyer Express further solidified its
position in the market. The only other significant UK airline was British Midland.
When low cost carriers like EasyJet and Ryanair started out in 1995, BA set up Go, a
low cost no frills airline, in 1998.
In the second part of the strategy, BA and a consortium of German banks, acquired
49% stakes in Delta Air (a domestic German airline) in 1992. In 1997, it acquired the
remaining 51% stake as well. In 1993, it bought 49.9 % of TAT, France's largest
independent domestic airline.9
As the industry gains maturity over years, airlines all over have been constantly
revising their strategies for growth and encountering competition. This has been
driven by one particular need, survival. Ironically, prosperity in this glamorous
industry is secondary. These strategies cover cost cutting measures, better
management and most importantly, strategic alliances with other airlines. These
alliances are guided by the bilateral air services agreement system. In many cases
code-sharing agreements have been made to maintain or expand coverage. This
international code sharing has become a part of bilateral negotiations.
Such code-share alliances have served many purposes for the airlines operating in the
domain. They do not need to own and operate aircraft in a particular region to earn
revenues. Also, this has shielded the airlines from unprofitable operations that would
have resulted from their operations if undertaken all alone. Alliances also create
marketing advantage for the partners.
Alliance is a catchall expression that airlines have adopted for various strategies they
have adopted to expand their services (Yergin et al., 2000). These range from
cooperation on activities like ticketing and baggage handling or reciprocal
participation in frequent-flyer programmes to integration that includes code-sharing,
revenue sharing for the use of network (pro-rate agreement), joint ground service,
joint telephone call centres, joint marketing, sharing aircraft and now, even aircraft
purchases. The customers have also shown preference for airlines with larger
networks to minimize their own cost of travel, get better services and to take
advantage of better frequent flyer programmes. In addition the alliances offer better
access and passage at congested airports, which is an attraction to both consumers and
airlines alike. The benefits of economies of scale are self-evident that flow in as a
result of such activity. The overall aim of the alliances is to create a win-win situation
for all the alliance partners. In other words, their ultimate aim is to enhance partner
airlines’ competitive positions and to achieve higher profits for all the partners in the
alliance.10
The first international alliance took place between Air Florida and British Island in
1986. This was of code sharing nature. Since then there has been a frenzy of alliances
in the industry.
The Rationale For Entering Into Alliances
It has been pointed out above that the enhanced US competitiveness due to
deregulation made it necessary for the other big players in the market to look for
alternatives, which could shield them from the onslaught of US airlines at their home
turfs/ dominant markets.
There may be several reasons as pointed out in the strategic management literature.
Oum, Park and Zhang(2000, p. 4-5) have observed that there is no universally
accepted definition of strategic alliance. For the airline industry they define the term
as ”…a long term partnership of two or more firms who attempt to enhance
competitive advantages collectively vis-à-vis their competitors by sharing scarce
resources including brand assets and market access capability, enhancing service
quality, and thereby, improving profitability.” They have then extended it to practical
application as, “In practical terms, a strategic alliance is one involving strategic
commitment by top management to link up a substantial part of their respective route
networks as well as collaborating on some key areas of airline business.”
Several authors have pointed out various reasons for formation of strategic alliances
in the airline industry. Burton and Hanlon (1994) opine that alliances are central to
formulation of business strategy. Further, they argue that in airline industry there are
no  a priori reasons for consolidation through alliances. The airlines enter into
alliances to gain economies of scale and more importantly, that of scope.11
Youssef (1992, as quoted in Youssef and Hansen, 1994) has put forth two theories
that try to explain the reason for alliances to take place. The first theory is related to
attaining the technical efficiencies of lower production costs/ better service
characteristics available to larger airlines in comparison to smaller airlines. The
alliances allow the partners to consolidate facilities like maintenance bases. Also,
each airline then has increased geographical reach and the network increases. This
increase in network coverage has the benefit of improved quality and quantity of
service (with assumptions about passenger acceptability) that are fallout of either
better schedule coordination or perception by the passengers. Secondly, with increase
in network there will be enhanced benefits of frequent flyer programs that may be
offered to the passengers. Thus, there will be more attractions for passengers to fly a
particular airline and the airlines are immensely benefited as they have increased
coverage without increasing their individual route systems. This may then lead to
lower unit production costs and economies of network density result.
The second explanation for the formation of strategic alliances is their possible use to
limit competition in the markets. As there exist several restrictions on market and
route entry, capacity and pricing in domestic and international aviation markets,
strategic alliances enable formation of virtual monopolies in markets between the
hubs of alliance partners. This can limit the competition through monopolization in
the hubs. In addition, there will be disincentive for any other airline to expand through
internal expansion.
Clearly, the biggest motivation for airlines to enter into alliances is to expand market
feed. Some airlines that are dominant in their home markets have entered into an
alliance with an international airline to provide feed to their airlines. The agreement
between Jet Airways (an airline operating in the Indian domestic market) and KLM is
one such example. Then, there are other reasons like the governments seeking better
management practices in the airlines by improving performance and economic
returns.12
The two authors then summarize the requirements for partners for entering into
alliances into 3 categories with their example of SAS and Swissair alliance:
Convergence: Similar images of carriers in quality of service, safety and technical
competence.
Competitiveness: the incumbents need to be competitive in their own markets that can
then yield to increased competitiveness for all in the joint schemes.
Complementarity in terms of routes served so that there are more routes than before
that could be served. This will provide the necessary scope economies.
Oum et al. (2000) have drawn similies between alliances in other industries and
airline industry. They put forth the main reasons for entering into strategic alliances as
the desire to attain economies of specialization and scale achieved by specialization of
knowledge in a particular field/ arena; cross country specialization (as in the theory of
competitive advantage of nations); gain the benefits of owing the ‘new to world’
products and cash on its novelty (as the case of alliance between IBM and Microsoft
to simultaneously develop the hard and soft components of a PC) or to gain the top
end of the market.
Besides the alliances come in handy to overcome restrictive entry policies as enforced
by some countries. Airline industry is clearly an example of such restricted policies. It
is highly paradoxical that though this has perhaps the greatest role in quick spread of
globalization, there are several restrictions around the world that have held it back
from becoming fully global by itself. Similar views are expressed by Staniland (1998)
quoting KLM chairman who himself had expressed alliances as being a reasoned
response to the antiquated regulatory system and facilitators for providing indirect
access to restricted markets.13
Further, they cite the risk sharing advantages of the alliances and the advantages
accruing due to convergence of technology and products across the industries. Lastly,
when the resources of one player are scarce, pooling of resources may provide the
necessary global scales in branding as well. Such common branding then contributes
to increased mind space and increased market share. (Alpert and Kamins (1995) argue
that consumers have a favourable perception and attitude towards pioneer brands.)
Then, Oum et al. (2001), focus on the airline industry and identify the following as
the most common and most important reasons to form strategic alliances:
(a)  Reach of Seamless Service Networks: A connection of networks gives the
consumers a large choice of destinations to choose from and plan better,
connections are eased out and there are increased benefits of Frequent Flyer
Programs (they have a broader range of benefits to offer) and lesser possibilities
of lost baggage. Also, the alliances’ network comes in handy when operations are
to be made in highly competitive, unprofitable and price sensitive market
conditions (e.g. pooling in of resources by two airlines to coordinate to overcome
otherwise unprofitable routes). By connecting the networks, partners are able to
expand their routes beyond their country territories.
Also, there are several restrictions on foreign ownership and fifth, seventh and
eighth freedom rights are generally not available. Even if some carriers manage to
get the requisite legal permissions, the costs associated -of time, risk and capital-
act as virtual barriers (potential facilitators) to direct entry by foreign airlines in
other markets (for forming strategic alliances).
(b) Enhanced Traffic Feed: With linkage of the airline networks the carriers can
increase their load factors with the increased feed. Also, flight frequency can be
increased without increasing the size of the fleet.
(c) Cost Reduction: The partners in the alliance can have the benefits of attaining the
economies of scale (through joint operations of air and ground services) and scope14
(through increased reach and efficient connections) and increased traffic density
(through network expansion and additional traffic feed).
(d) Service Quality Improvement: Ease of online connections, frequency and
schedule convenience has been marked as the dimensions of an airline’s service
quality. By entering into alliances, the schedules can be better-coordinated and
waiting time for passengers reduced. Further, the increase in itinerary choices is
another benefit that an alliance can offer to passengers.
(e) Marketing Advantages: The frequent flyer programs are pooled in an alliance and
the passengers thus have a wider choice as well as more chances to accrue points
to use later. Then there are many display benefits of Computerized Reservation
System for airlines entering into strategic alliances. The visibility on the CRS is
increased manifold as all the partners in the alliance show the flight to the same
destination as their own. Consequently, the chances that a traveller will fly a
particular airline are increased manifold. (Also observed in Burton and Hanlon,
1994.)
Increased market share and cooperative pricing that is possible is another reason that
airlines enter into strategic alliances. There have been concerns raised over time about
the anti-competitive effects of the alliances, there have been exemptions like KLM-
Northwest alliance, which received anti-trust immunity. This is reportedly one of the
reasons that Netherlands became the first country to sign an Open Skies pact with the
US.
As Doganis (1994) has also observed that the larger airlines offer the FFP members
more opportunities to collect and use points. They may also act as a potential entry
barrier for small start-ups. In addition, they provide access to information on
passenger characteristics and needs and also direct marketing access to large number
of frequent travellers. The data as provided in the same paper suggests that there is15
high non-redemption rate that offsets the potential huge costs that the airlines may
have to incur in flying passengers for “free”.
Another reason to enter into alliance has been put forward by de Wit (1996), where he
finds alliances a convenient way to form a multiple hub structure.  This multiple hub
structure will give the alliance an edge over any other airline that wishes to operate in
Europe.  A pan European alliance or an alliance dominant in Europe will be an
attractive partner that will be sought to become one of the members of a global
alliance. This is also one of the identified pre-requisites of a potential partner willing
to join a global network (Oum, Taylor and Zhang, 1993).
CLASSIFYING ALLIANCES
There is no consensus on classification of alliances in airline industry. There exist
several ways in which alliances are classified. One preferred way is to categorize
them into 3 categories depending on the extent of co-ordination:
(1)  Simple route by route alliance (interline),
(2)  Broad commercial alliance,
(3)  Equity alliance.
(A)  Interline Alliance: The Interline Alliance is simplest of them all. It involves low
level of co-ordination on few routes. Potential areas of co-ordination include
ground handling, joint use of ground facilities, code sharing and joint operations,
block space sale, and co-ordination of flight schedules for directly related flights.
(B)  Broad Commercial Alliance: The Broad Commercial Airline Alliance extends
the areas of co-ordination to joint development of systems and joint marketing16
activities. It is wider for it may comprise of code sharing and sharing frequent
flyer programmes. This may also include transfer of traffic at hub airport to other
airline. An example is the One World Alliance that was founded on February 1,
1999. The founder members of the Alliance are American Airlines, British
Airways, Cathay Pacific and Qantas. Later, in September 1999, Finnair and
Iberia joined in the alliance. This expanded further with the inclusion of Aer
Lingus (June 2000) and LAN Chile (June 2000). This alliance has assets of
nearly 2000 aircraft with more than 300 still on order. It is spread in more than
130 countries across more than 550 destinations, employs nearly 260,000 people.
This is an example of how the alliances can be useful to customers for they can
offer the benefits that are way beyond the reach of individual airlines.
(C)  Equity Alliance: In Equity Alliance, as the name suggests, there may be equity
swap among the partners. Thus, the partners generally co-operate in all areas of
joint activities. It may involve code sharing on a large number of routes so that
all the partners gain the leverage from the strategic alliance they have entered
into. The alliance between American Airlines and Canadian Airlines
International of 1994 is an example of this kind of alliance. AA invested US$190
million in equity and voting shares of CAI. This is most durable type of alliance,
but the proportion of such type has declined and the carriers mostly enter into
commercial alliance.
It should be borne in mind that alliances are just another milestone in this very bumpy
ride of the aviation industry. They are in no way the end of the journey because
international air transport is a dynamic industry. Changes may occur in any area of
alliance. There are cases where the alliances continue for years and on the other end,
alliances break away in a few weeks’ time.
Another view of the airline alliances is to see them in the light of alliances between
airlines. The inter-airline alliance arrangements are complex. They can be broadly
divided into two categories (Doganis, 2001):17
(i)  Strategic Alliances
(ii)  Commercial (Marketing) Alliances
Strategic Alliances: When the partners co-mingle their assets in order to pursue a
single or joint set of business objectives. These co-mingled assets may be terminal
facilities, maintenance bases, aircraft, staff, traffic rights or capital resources. This is
extended to two or more airlines offering a common brand and a uniform service
standard. The franchisee partner may be much smaller than the other, however the
fact, that they share a common objective of leveraging the alliance to increase their
profits, makes the alliance strategic.
Marketing (Commercial) Alliances: They are different from strategic alliances as
the partners stay independent of each other and each partner pursues his own
objectives. Thus, many code-sharing agreements, joint frequent flyer programmes and
some block space arrangements are essentially marketing alliances.
Literature suggests another classification of alliances on the basis of GEOGRAPHIC
SCOPE. This again can be done in two ways:
(i)  Regional Alliances: These alliances are on a wider scale. They can further be
of two kinds.
The first is a commercial agreement covering many routes, though usually
from a particular geographical region or a country. Such agreements,
generally, involve, code-shared flights, joint marketing and sales, some
capacity coordination, use of each other's business lounges and so on.
(Example, 1999 alliance of Malaysian Airlines and Thai Airways covering
code sharing on several routes with in their countries. Similar alliance existed
between SIA, Air New Zealand and Ansett. This alliance covered routes
between South East Asia and Australasia as well as some routes within18
Australia. Also, the alliances between Swissair and Austrian or Lufthansa and
SAS would also fall under the category of regional alliances.)
The second kind of regional alliance is a franchise agreement between a larger
carrier and a smaller regional or feeder operator carrier. The regional operator
adopts the livery, brand and service standards of the franchiser and normally
only carries the regional operator's flight code. (In 1999, British Airways had
nine franchise partners, seven of them being in UK and one each in Denmark
and South Africa. Together they added 74 destinations to BA's network.
(ii)  Global Alliances: These have global scope and are the most significant
strategic alliances in terms of network expansion. The prime purpose here is to
achieve all the marketing benefits of scope and cost economies from any
synergies through linking two or more large airlines operating in
geographically distinct (ideally continents) markets. Global alliances normally
involve code sharing on a large number of routes. They may, however, extend
to include schedule co-ordination, joint sales offices, ground handling,
combined frequent flyer programmes, joint maintenance activities as well as
some equity stake transfer. The individual members may have a large number
of route specific and a small number of regional alliances.
Burton and Hanlon (1994) provide yet another categorization. They argue that
alliances can be categorized on the basis of extent of cooperation, motive and scope
of co-operation.
When the alliances are graded along extent of cooperation, the resulting strategic
alliance is horizontal (pooling for cooperative scheduling and joint marketing),
vertical (customer services like car rentals, travel agents) or external (‘diversification’
alliance, e.g. alliance between AT&T and Delta to handle computing requirements not
related to reservations).19
The motives behind forming the alliance may be technical or market related.
Alliances that allow the airlines to leverage their maintenance facilities for mutual use
fall in such category. In 1968, KLM, SAS, Swissair and the former UTA got together
to form KSSU. This was found with the objective of economizing on aircraft
maintenance. This is also handy in shifting the base from a high cost base to a low
cost base. Besides, code share agreements, frequent flyer programs and block-space
arrangements are all covered under the marketing motives. Another important area
where both motives are evident together is the development of sophisticated computer
reservation systems. These systems are very important as marketing tool and are very
costly to build. The pooling in of resources by various airlines is definitely of help.
The third area is on the lines of scope of cooperation and largely relates to inter-firm
governance. There are instances when there is informal understanding amongst the
boards and there is no managerial control exchange. In other instances, there is
change and the directors of both the partners are represented on the board of the
allying airlines. There is the extra element of managerial control exchange brought in
it, and obviously, the stakes are higher. Thus, huge investments of BA in purchasing
equity in other airlines shows a more definitive commitment towards better
performance and a serious interest in long-term collaboration.
The alliances can also be viewed along a spectrum (Doganis, 2001). The spectrum
starts from a very straightforward marketing alliance (as in interlining agreement or a
joint frequent flyer program; example is Jet Airways (India) and KLM alliance).
These agreements move towards strategic alliances as the overlap in the use of assets
and integration of businesses increases. Mergers occupy the other end of the
spectrum, which is called as the ultimate strategic alliance. However, it is important to
note that share purchases or mutual swaps do not necessarily indicate a strategic
alliance if the partners continue to pursue their own objectives. Such arrangement can
best be called commercial agreement that is concerned with joint operations with the20
underlying purpose being cost reduction and market increase, rather achieve a
common goal with common philosophy of business.
Here it is useful to note once again that though the aviation industry is a great enabler
in the process of globalization, it itself has been subject to severe restrictions all over
the globe and cannot yet be said to be a global industry (Yergin et al., 2000;
Staniland, 1998). Nonetheless, the airlines all over find it increasingly necessary to
become a part of a major alliance at the global level. Some of the benefits of a global
alliance have already been highlighted earlier. The impact of global alliances can be
gauged from the fact that there are 4 major global alliance networks viz.; Star
Alliance, One World Alliance, Sky Team Alliance and the Wings alliance, which is
smallest of the 4. These four alliances accounted for about 57 percent of the world’s
passenger km in 1998 (Doganis, 2001, p. 71) and carried over 70 percent of the











Star 15 124 USD 67.5 billion 2,058 292 million
One World 8 135 USD 51 billion 1,983 230 million
Sky Team 6 114 USD 50 billion 1,224 228 million
Wings 3 100 USD 25 billion 899 114 million
These figures are for the latest financial year available with the sources.
Sources: Company literature, Air Transport World – World Airlines Report, 2002.
ALLIANCES BRING…
There are several opinions on what the alliances in the airline industry result/ have
resulted in. there are some opinions that throw some caution on the alliances. The21
approach here is to identify both the advantages and disadvantages rather make a
judgement on their nature.
THE ADVANTAGES
Yergin et al. (2000) have found that global alliance formation is most apparent change
to the public eye in the last 5-7 years. The initiative to rationalize their operations,
build more effective marketing coverage and offer more seamless, hassle-free
transportation than competitors in the face of tight regulatory environment
overlooking the industry.
The airlines benefit from the economies of scale and scope (Burton and Hanlon, 1994;
Doganis, 1994, 2001; Oum et al., 2000). Most of the benefits that arise out of airline
alliances have also been the reasons for entering into alliances. Still to recapitulate,
airline alliances bring in the benefits of shared costs thus leading to lower costs per
unit for the allying partners. Then there are economies of scope that arise out of
increased reach and enhanced feed brought in by network partners. The marketing
alliances that allow use of brand name, livery, uniform, brand image (Burton and
Hanlon, 1994), blocked space arrangements that guarantee availability of seats and
revenues and the benefits of code sharing all on a global scale are easiest promised
only by strategic alliances. It would be very difficult for an airline to build a global
network on its own because of the prevailing regulations and restrictions in the
globalization of the greatest enabler of globalization.
In a report released by the US Department of Transportation in October 2000, the
alliances between Northwest-KLM, United-Lufthansa, and between Delta, Austrian,
Sabena, Swissair were studied to get empirical evidence on the benefits that were
made available to consumers in the transatlantic market. It was found that these22
alliances coupled with the Open Skies initiative resulted in decline in average fares in
the period 1996-99. It was concluded that airlines can offer improved, more
marketable services and that they are the principal driving force behind transatlantic
price reductions and traffic gains. The traffic gains were not simply diversion from
others, but largely due to addition of new traffic. Also, it was evident that geographic
expansion taking place resulted in growth of traffic and as the improved services were
provided to more passengers in more markets, the competitive overlap too increased
with expansion. The alliances between the carriers under observation also revealed
that there was development of new European hubs consequent to increase in traffic
levels in beyond Europe markets. There were significant increases in the traffic levels
and price decreases between smaller cities of Europe and not so well developed hubs
(like Portland, Oregon) of USA. For instance, the fare levels for smaller European
destinations declined by 33 percent in the period 1995-1999, while the traffic
increased by huge 138 percent in the same period.
The report finally concluded that international airline alliances have improved
services in historically underserved regions of the world, and as a result, have
stimulated additional demand for air transportation in those markets.
Gudmundsson (1999) has pointed out the benefits of alliances to be code-sharing,
amalgamation of frequent flyer programs, increased traffic feed (economies of scope
and density come into play to the benefit of the airlines), schedule coordination
leading to enhanced ‘perceived’ seamlessness, elimination of duplication of certain
tasks (such as offices), easier access to congested airport gates, technical cooperation,
access to established system of travel agents’ and finally, the halo effect that stems
from the tendency of travel agents to book a well known domestic brand.
While studying the international alliance between SAS and the erstwhile Swissair,
Youssef and Hansen (1994) concluded that the alliance increased both the quantity
and quality of the partners’ connecting services. Also the cost savings resulting in
from the alliance were expected to lower fares in the market to the extent competition23
existed in a particular. Thus the fare reductions were at best expected to be in line
with market conditions rather across the board reduction that will benefit the
passengers at large.
The international marketing alliances that take place between the airlines offered two
additional advantages. One, they enabled the airlines to expand their existing markets
through extra traffic generated by the feed to and from the airline partner; and two,
new markets were developed that were previously inaccessible to them (Doganis,
2001). Lufthansa had claimed in 1997 that its marketing alliances with United, SAS,
Thai, South African and VARIG were producing benefits of DM 250-270 million a
year. Clearly after the much broader and larger Star Alliance was formed the potential
will have gone even higher. The international airline alliances have also proved
beneficial to the underserved regions like Africa wherein the alliance partners could
increase services due to better market penetration. This is evident from data that
yields to Africa, Middle East and Far East have decreased by 32, 29 and 35 percent
respectively over a period spanning from 1992 to 1999 (USDOT, 2000). This has
stimulated additional demand for air transportation in such markets.
The alliances and the cooperation results in lower fares in interline markets. The
competition loss in the inter-hub market tends to effect a raise in fares in that
particular market. Also, the rise in traffic in the interline market offsets the increase in
fares in the inter-hub market (Brueckner, 2001). From 1997 data, the fare charged by
alliance partners for a representative trip in a behind the gateway market is 18 percent
lower than fare charged by 2 non-allied carriers. It also reveals that there are lower
fares in the behind the gateway markets and higher fares in the gateway to gateway
markets. Also, the benefits arising out of a multitude of behind the gateway market
might actually offset the harms caused by the increase in gateway-to-gateway
markets. The total outcome is therefore, expected to be positive (Brueckner and
Whalen, 2001).24
A study on the business travel decision-making revealed that corporates were
increasingly looking forward to global alliances to sign contracts that will allow
access to lower/ cheaper rates of travel to companies for their employees. As many as
47 percent companies studied felt that alliance groups resulted in cheaper travel and
75 percent of the travel managers believed that their companies would sign a global
deal with an alliance group in next 5 years. In that study, the major benefits were seen
as the more attractive FFPs, seamless travel experience and service enhancements that
result from the alliance (Mason, 2002).
The reduction in IATA's authority on deciding fares over a period of time, fares are
now mostly set through a process of strategic interaction. This process results in
elimination of "double marginalization". Consequently, fares are lowered (Brueckner,
2001). An important observation is that the anti-trust immunity has to be maintained.
There are views in the literature that domestic airline alliances, like that of Delta and
United Airlines in the US, induce international benefits for the airlines. The cost and
benefits of the alliance in the domestic market are almost the same (Clougherty,
2000). It is the gain through improved performance in the international market that is
the guiding factor. Going back to the Delta and United Airlines' alliance, the Delta
lacks extensive international routes that United has. The new international routes
gained through the alliance will ably support the extensive domestic coverage of
Delta.
Clougherty (2000) argues that when international markets are characterized by
Cournot competition, domestic airline concentration improves international
performance of a national airline industry. This is achieved on the supply-side
through improved scale economies and reduced competition in the domestic market.
These economies of scale come through; (a) extensive and enhanced use of hub and
spoke network, and; (b) lower competition that helps the airlines reap density
economies in that market segment. As a natural consequence, better domestic
coverage means that there are more passengers available to the network (alliance) to
feed international flights.25
On the demand-side, there is product differentiation resulting from enhanced Frequent
Flyer Programmes, marketing, visibility and other service amenities. Thus, while the
number of competitors in the international market remains constant, the allying
airlines increase efficiency.
Clougherty (2000) finds that the US domestic airline industry stands to gain
approximately $350 million in additional producer surplus due to alliances in
domestic market. Additionally, 4 million passengers may be fed in to the international
flights of various US operators. Also, home nation international consumers likely face
more competitive international markets with lower fares.
Thus providing for the equivalence between the gains and the costs of the domestic
alliance, the international gains resulting from these alliances as discussed above,
likely, improves national welfare.
Oum et al. (2000) found that strategic alliances have significant effects on
productivity, pricing and profitability of alliance partners. They also found that
formation of alliances had a positive effect on the value of partner firms. In their
study of 58 international alliances over 1989-98 period, they found that share value of
firms participating in the alliance has increased and such increase was similar
irrespective of the size of the firm. In addition, the alliances with a broad scope of
strategic cooperation create more value than alliances with a narrow scope of tactical
cooperation. Furthermore, when a strategic alliance with a broad scope of cooperation
is combined with equity investment, the value creation effect of the alliance is further
strengthened.
There are concerns that infrastructure constraints by way of availability of slots at the
airports located at the major cities/ hubs. In such cases, alliances between airlines can
provide much needed slots for landing or take off. The alliances have the potential to
provide the allying partner easier access to certain desired slots (held by other partner)
that are otherwise unavailable or are too costly to be bought. This was an important
issue in BA/ AA/ Iberia alliance as identified by Gudmundsson (1999) and also Flôres
Jr. (1996). Further, alliances are a way out to bypass the costly airport charges that26
need to be paid for every landing and take-off. The alliance partner’s flights could be
used to ferry in the passengers at a higher load factor (i.e. the number of flights
remaining the same, more passengers are carried to and from the airport), thus
reducing the costs for the airlines.
There is a caution however, to the alliances. It should not be taken for granted that all
alliances will be beneficial. Vander Kraats (2000) observes that extent of benefits of
the alliance depends on geographic scope of agreement, degree of operational and
marketing integration between partners and revenue sharing agreement. He further
suggests that true economic advantage can be gained only through making a single
entity unifying all business aspects. This suggests increased concentration and the
consumer welfare is likely to be jeopardized.
THE DISADVANTAGES
Borenstein (1992) found that with deregulation setting in the US domestic airline
industry there was fall in prices in long distance routes while the short distance routes
had little or negative change as prices increased in some markets. He also understood
that TACOs (Travel Agent Commission Override) play an important role in
increasing the feed to the carrier and also results in increased market power of the
airline. Also, the horizontal mergers between direct competitors (a result of some
strategic alliances, also discussed by Burton and Hanlon, 1994) were found to have
negative effect on the welfare of the passengers in the short-run. Whatever production
efficiency the mergers may have permitted was reflected not in the prices but in the
increased market power. The long run effects could not be estimated because of
possible extinction without such mergers of some of the firms in the study. It has also
been reported that as the alliances increase there is increased concentration in the
industry (Borenstein, 1992; Brueckner and Whalen, 2000; Cooper, 2001).27
Furthermore, the code sharing holds the potential to be a mask for anti-competitive
arrangements between competitors to allocate markets, limit capacity, raise fares or
push the rivals out of the markets (Vander Kraats, 2000).
There are instances when previously there were 2 carriers operating on a route.
However, after the alliance was formed there was just one player on the route. E.g.,
Swissair purchased 49.5% of Sabena and services between Switzerland and Belgium
were rationalized. Effectively, routes where there was duopoly earlier, now were
monopolies. Competition was eliminated, capacity growth could be constrained and
fares could be kept high. In their study, Brueckner and Whalen (2000) have also
concluded that absence of an anticompetitive alliance effect must be viewed as a
tentative conclusion. They could not establish if an alliance between two previously
competitive carriers would result in an increase of fares.
In an analysis of a strategic global alliance (between the Northwest Airlines and the
Continental) by the US General Accounting Office (as quoted in Hemphill, 2000) it
was found that there was acute potential for reduction in competition in one-stop
market because many such routes were served by alliances joining the same alliance.
Transport Research Board (TRB) of the National Research Council of the US in its
report issued in 1999 recommended a number of suggestions to safeguard and further
competition in the US airline industry. This report showed concerns that code sharing
and other collaborative arrangements among large US airlines would result in
considerable consolidation among current and potential rivals. Additionally, global
alliances between airlines of the US and that of other countries could, reportedly, be
harmful in the long run by reducing competition in primary international routes and
making it harder for non-aligned carriers to compete domestically as well as
internationally.
Oum et al. (1993) argued that there would be global networks that would provide
service to most of the large and medium sized cities around the world, particularly in
North America, Europe and Asia. They also expected that there would be
consolidation as witnessed in US, US-Canada and Europe and that major chunk of the28
world air passenger market will lie with 5-6 alliances. Today, with 4 major global
alliance groupings (Star, Wings, One World, KLM/ NW) ruling over 70 percent of
international air travel (Yergin et al., 2000), the authors’ prognosis has come true.
Doganis (1994) also studied the liberalization of the European airlines also concluded
that there will be concentration in the industry and it will become increasingly
oligopolistic in character following mergers and alliances that themselves will be the
results of deregulation of the European market. Burton and Hanlon (1994) also found
that there would be an increased market power that will be available to larger players
(who are members of large alliances). The anticompetitive effects of market power
were likely to be most marked for short haul markets. Also, there was a potential
threat that the old- horizontal pooling arrangements will return. The competition was
likely to reduce if there was no new entry in the markets.
In their study of SAS and Swissair alliance, Youssef and Hansen (1994) put that
alliances had the potential to stop competition that could otherwise have occurred
from airlines that sought to increase their market share through internal expansion.
All this was in addition to direct reduction of competition through monopolization
effect that alliances brought along. The alliance in question resulted in an increased
concentration in the markets where they had competed earlier and the fares in non-
stop markets between alliance partner hubs have increased more than in other non-
stop markets in the same region. This, too, was mediated by concentration. Though
the cost savings from the alliance were expected to bring down the fares, the
increased market power was expected to nullify the effect. As noted earlier, while
commenting on market power and mergers, Kim and Singal (1993) pointed that loss
of one competitor increases fares by approximately 10% on average. Also it was
hypothesized that with increase in market concentration the potential to exercise
market power is greater. It was also found that on routes where the merging firms had
neither common hubs nor overlapping service there was exercise of increased power.
In cases, where merger involved a financially distressed airline, there was steep
increase in fare levels. The consumer was thus worse off.   Stavins (2000) while29
testing for price discrimination in competitive markets found that though there was a
decrease in price discrimination with market concentration and the discounts were
lesser on routes with higher market concentration.
Gudmundsson (1999) also noted that there was enhanced market presence through
code sharing. This was a strategic advantage derived from the alliance and had a
potentially negative impact on consumer interests.
Brueckner and Whalen (1998) also found that alliances increased fares in gateway-to-
gateway markets and that they were beneficial only in behind the gateway markets.
The negative effects in such markets could be offset only by intervention by
regulatory authorities. In addition the domestic alliances had the potential of
exercising greater anti-competitive effects than the international alliances and it needs
to be checked.
Brueckner and Spiller (2000), however, could not gather enough evidence of an anti-
competitive effect in gateway-to-gateway markets. Though they found that there
would be an increase of 5 percent in case of an alliance, this was found statistically
insignificant.
Flôres Jr. (1998) has pointed out that alliances were essentially a tool used by main
players in the industry to enlarge their market share. The innate desire was to gain
total market control within the prevailing regulatory framework. In other words, their
main utility was to gain or protect market share rather use them for cost saving or
efficiency improvement purposes. Flôres finds it difficult to define the global
pressures on the airline alliances except for negative characterization in the sense that
they are all kinds of agreements that are less than a standard, autonomous joint
venture. He also opined that the alliances are transitionary in nature and as such, are
doomed. There will be bigger carriers emerging from each group of alliances. This
further strengthens the opinion that there will be increasing concentration in the
airline industry that will further increase the market power of the players in the
industry which can then be exploited against consumer benefits.30
Various reports have indicated that the mergers (another form of strategic alliances,
broadly speaking) in the airline industry, especially in the US have resulted in
formation of a cartel. A handful of major firms are dominating the market and they
rarely compete with each other. The formation of fortress hubs is being used as
effective entry barrier and the advantages of hub and spoke networks are not passed
on to the consumers (Cooper, 2001).
Further, the US Department of Transportation has identified 15 airports where market
share of dominant firm exceeded the monopoly limits of 70%. The industry was
found to be in the moderately concentrated market with a Herfindahl- Hirschman
Index (HHI) of 1400. (HHI 1000-1800 => moderately concentrated; 1800+=> Highly
concentrated). With another two mergers allowed - United/US & American/TWA and
Delta/NW or Delta/Continental - HHI levels shall cross 2200 mark!
Cooper (2001) also contemplates that in reality, market power is abused and the
theoretical benefits of the alliances are actually never passed on to the consumers.
Also, there should be actual competition on the routes rather have potential
competition as the beneficial effects of potential competition are much smaller
compared to those of actual competition. Hub concentration measures of 1995 (GAO
study) resulted in 22.1% increase in the prices. Morrison and Winston (1995) have
found that hubbing; frequent flyer and CRS manipulation activities together could
affect the prices to the extent of 22.7%. These together with fare restrictions could
result in 46% effect on the prices. In a DOT (US) study, low cost carrier entry or exit
at all hubs could affect the prices by 35%. This is even more significant at the
concentrated hubs, where it touches the level of 40%. Bryer (1990) also upholds
Cooper's view that it is difficult to estimate the number of potential competitors and
thus the downward effect on prices cannot be ascertained. Further, he concludes that
there is a need for a strong antitrust policy to maintain competitive market structures
which otherwise stand under threat.31
News reports on mergers in airline industry have vociferously demanded that
regulatory authorities should intervene and stop the drive towards monopolization and
predatory pricing. (Barry, 2001; Lochhead, 1998)32
THE ISSUE OF SURVIVAL OF ALLIANCES
There have been several news items speaking of strategic alliances as short-term
marriages that hardly stand pressures of time. In a BCG report of 1995, it was pointed
out that Intercontinental alliances had a higher failure rate. About 67% of the alliances
formed in 1991/1992 fell by 1995. These failures had been in all the categories,
whether Non-Equity (Agreements or JVs) or Equity Alliances. Flôres (1998) has also
argued that the alliances are heading towards doom and that in the future there will be
no alliance but a few major airlines that will rule over the market. This makes it all
the more necessary to look at the longevity of the alliances.
There were various factors pointed out from the case study of alliances in the air
passenger transport industry. Avmark Aviation Economist  (1993) documented
reasons for failure as:
•  Too broad setting of objectives/ Incongruent objectives – It is realized later on
that very few practically possible opportunities exist.
•  Asymmetry of partners, in the size, for example.
•  Asymmetry of benefits versus expectations
•  Differing product/ service standards (this was also pointed out in Mason, 2002, as
this has potential of creating dissatisfaction among the consumers travelling on
different partners)
•  Lack of Exclusivity
•  Lack of management structures to make the alliances successful.
It also outlined design parameters and key issues for creating a successful alliance.
The key design parameters include:33
  Symmetry of partners by way of relative power, control over assets
  Familiarity with partner as to have no hidden agenda, cultural and
management style mix
  Term/ horizon for the alliance
  Equitable terms of sharing.
BCG outlined a model (Avmark Aviation Economist, 1993, p 22) which reveals that
alliances are an iterative process and they move on from setting of Objectives (with
mutual understanding) - to Design - to Implementation (laying down appropriate
structures and systems) - to Reassessment and Redesign of Relationship which then in
turn leads to resetting or relooking at the objectives of the alliance.
Doganis (2001) has suggested a 3-phase model for alliance building. The first phase
concentrates chiefly on revenue gains. These alliances have to be of commercial
nature. In other words, there is easy entry into and exit from the alliance. Phase two
involves continuing and reinforcing cooperation extended in Phase one, thus bringing
in operational gains to the alliance partners. This phase is likely to involve separate
agreements in one or more specific areas where joint operations can reduce costs, as
in ground handling or maintenance. These two phases, however, do not necessarily
cement the alliance. Cementing of the alliance takes place in the third phase when
partners commingle their assets and start using them jointly. There is joint product
development and creation of joint companies to manage different aspects of
operations. The partners are expected to move from having separate brand identities
to emphasising and even adopting a single alliance brand. The exit from the alliance
is very difficult.
It is notable that though there are large global alliances in the world skies, most of the
alliances have not moved beyond the first phase. The revenue focus of the partners34
makes the alliance highly vulnerable to sudden exit of the alliance partners. Delta
walking out of the Atlantic Excellence alliance in June 1999 is an example of this.
It is also necessary to understand that this approach of cementing the partnership has
to follow all the phases. KLM and Alitailia alliance is a case in point. The partners
were too eager to move to phase 3 without understanding the necessities of going
through phase 2. The alliance collapsed in May 2000.
The Key Success Factors in making the alliances can therefore be:
9  Set up concrete, realistic and specific goals.
9  Due diligence to be carried out by both partners.
9  A clear horizon and understanding of future direction of the alliance is
necessary.
9  Cost/ benefit analysis has to be carried out and there should be a move to
create a sense of mutual dependence.
9  Appropriate resources to be allocated to the alliance.
9  Communication amongst the partners should continue and success measured
from time to time.
9  Lastly, the alliances should be done away with when the partners feel that the
issues to them are no longer valid.35
SUMMARY
There is no doubt that air passenger transport has grown globally since deregulation.
With deregulation there was a move towards economising operations and attaining
economies of scale. The air transportation evolved from point-to-point, to, hub and
spokes, to, network formation amongst various hub and spokes networks. These
networks essentially involved strategic alliances of various forms. This led to increase
in passenger welfare in the form of lower fares and various programmes to enhance
perceived customer value. This, in turn, gave rise to strategic alliances of various
kinds and scope amongst the industry incumbents. There can be several parameters on
which the alliances could be classified and literature shows that there is no consensus
on the parameters.
Further while discussing the advantages and disadvantages of strategic alliances it is
observed that though the alliances were initially for the purpose of airline welfare
through cost reductions, the industry is gradually concentrating into a few hands. It
was observed that the phenomenon is evident at some US airports (reported by
Cooper, 2001). Globally, with 4 major alliances holding more than half the market, it
clearly is getting concentrated.
The fallout of this is clear. Firstly, smaller airlines (like that of Air India, Indian
Airlines) are likely to grow only as traffic feeders to bigger alliance partners due to
operating economies. Secondly, as it emerges, there is concentration happening in the
industry. This concentration may lead to cartel formation among airlines and the
benefits to consumer may actually get reduced and the basic premise of airline
deregulation stands negated.36
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Schematic Representation of an alliance classification method
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Source: Doganis, 2001, p. 6642









  Common ground handling
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                                                                             Franchising
                                                                                   Joint product development
                                                                                   Sharing of aircraft and crews
                                                                                   Single operating company
                                                                                        --Passengers
                                                                                        --Cargo
                                                                                   Single alliance brand
Source: Doganis, 2001, p. 86
1. PHASE ONE
2. PHASE  TWO



















Source: Doganis, 2001, p. 68.

































A.  Freedoms of Air:
1.  First Freedom: The right to fly over another country without landing.
2.  Second Freedom: The right to make a landing for technical reasons in
another country without picking up or setting down revenue traffic.
3.  Third Freedom: The right to carry revenue traffic from your own country
(X) to the treaty partner’s country (Y).
4.  Fourth Freedom: The right to carry revenue traffic from other country (Y)
back to your own country (X).
5.  Fifth Freedom: The right of an airline from country X to carry revenue
traffic between other countries such as W and Z on services starting or
ending in its home country X. (Use of this freedom, however, requires
agreement of countries W and Z).
6.  Sixth Freedom: The use by an airline of country X of two sets of 3
rd and 4
th
freedom rights to carry traffic between two other countries but using its base
at X as transit point.
7.  Seventh Freedom: The right of an airline to carry revenue traffic between
points in two countries on services that lie entirely outside its own home
country.
8.  Eighth Freedom (Cabotage rights): The right of an airline to pick up and set
down revenue traffic between two domestic points in another country on a
servicing originating in its own home country.
The first 5 freedoms are negotiated in the bilateral air services agreements. The latter
3 are called the supplementary rights. The 6
th freedom rights are generally referred to45
implicitly in memoranda of understanding attached to the agreement. The 7
th and 8
th
freedoms are granted only in very rare cases.
Definitions of some of the terms used
TACOs Travel Agent commission overrides involve paying higher
commission if the agent reaches a certain level of bookings.
Overrides vary from carrier to carrier and from market to market.
Code Sharing  When two or more airlines use their own flight codes or a common
code on a flight operated by one of them.
RPKs Revenue Passenger Kilometres is the product of number of fare
paying passengers on each flight-by-flight stage distance. They are
a measure of an airline’s passenger traffic.
Slot  Slot at an airport is the right to operate one take-off or landing at
that airport within a fixed time period.
HHI US Department of justice explains that Herfindahl-Hirschman
Index is a commonly accepted measure of market concentration. It
is calculated by squaring the marketing share of each firm
competing in the market and then summing the resulting numbers.